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It is not often that one hears of a political philosopher characterized as an Aristotelian 
advocating for “a politics of resistance,”1 having combined a certain conservatism with radicalism, 
yet so it is with Alasdair MacIntyre.  MacIntyre’s moral and political philosophy has been one of the 
foremost expressions of modern virtue ethics and Aristotelianism albeit of a rather individual 
variety.  MacIntyre’s status as a political philosopher is predominantly based upon his 
recommendations for a politics of community, which in turn draws upon Aristotle’s ideal πόλις or 
city-state as a model; however, his advocacy for the restoration of Aristotelian communities in 
modern life is accompanied by a denunciation of modern-day political arrangements, such as the 
liberal state.  Yet in spite of his preoccupation with matters political, MacIntyre himself does not 
seem to treat the realm of politics seriously as a legitimate field of its own, that is, as a realm related 
to but distinct from ethics.  MacIntyre reduces politics to a mere subcategory of ethics, the sum of 
the institutions necessary for the achievement of human flourishing.  This makes his theory of the 
ideal state2 attractive for ethical reasons, yet such a state is nearly impossible to implement on a 
political level.  MacIntyre’s problem is thus twofold; he proposes a theory of the state which 
paradoxically ignores the realities of the political world and likewise fails to describe adequately how 
an individual ought to proceed in the absence of those ‘political’ institutions which make a fully 
ethical life possible. 
It is my contention that this situation might be ameliorated, even if it is not wholly dispensed 
with, by acknowledging the answers Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition provide with regard to 
the above quandaries.  With such an acknowledgement, MacIntyre would not need to abandon his 
allegiance to Aristotle nor sell out to liberalism, yet he would need to accept that a political system, 
                                                           
1 Kelvin Knight, “Introduction” in The MacIntyre Reader, ed. Kelvin Knight (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 
1998), 23. 
2 Some might quibble with my description of MacIntyre’s ideal political arrangement as a ‘state’ since MacIntyre usually 
reserves that term for the modern liberal states.  It is also true that the term ‘state’ is a modern development and thus 
carries with it much baggage from the modern world (thus making it a rather unsuitable term to describe political 
arrangements modeled on those of antiquity).  Nonetheless, if we understand ‘state’ in a very broad sense as a political 
unit which governs itself, I believe it can apply to MacIntyre’s description of what he calls the political community. 
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other than those of his ideal state, is ‘legitimate’ even in the modern state.  MacIntyre’s intransigence 
about the impossibility of participation in the governments of modern states has largely stemmed 
from his definition of the political as constituted by the practice, namely politics, through which 
“other types of practice are ordered, so that individuals may direct themselves towards what is best 
for them and for the community.”3  In MacIntyre’s ideal world, the term ‘political’ ought to extend 
only to those arrangements where the government orders certain practices in view of some agreed 
notion of human flourishing.  As MacIntyre claims that the modern state does not engage in 
‘politics’ as defined above and dogmatically denies that there is significant benefit from engaging 
with the modern state, it is unclear how he expects his communities of virtuous citizens to emerge 
other than through revolution or resistance: “Modern systematic politics, whether liberal, 
conservative, radical or socialist, simply has to be rejected from a standpoint that owes genuine 
allegiance to the tradition of the virtues, for modern politics itself expresses in its institutional forms 
a systematic rejection of that tradition.”4  Therefore, in both instances cited here, MacIntyre defines 
what is authentically ‘political’ by what is ‘ethical’ or what ‘owes genuine allegiance’ to the pursuit of 
the virtuous life.  A necessary corrective to this narrow definition can be found in Aristotle and his 
predecessors who understood the ‘political’ to be characterized also by the exercise of power or 
force and the need for preservation.  Once equipped with such an understanding of politics, 
MacIntyre might be able to transform his ideal state achievable only in speculative thought into a 
goal, however distant, which one can pursue within the contemporary power structure. 
To demonstrate this, one must both understand the reasons behind MacIntyre’s own 
formulation of the ideal state and subsequently argue, on MacIntyrean grounds, why MacIntyre 
himself is inconsistent in his discussion of the ‘political.’  However, before this is possible, we must 
                                                           
3 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good” in The MacIntyre Reader, ed. Kelvin Knight (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 241. 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 255. 
5 
 
first identify what it in fact means to argue something ‘on MacIntyrean grounds.’  If one is 
attempting to mount a challenge to MacIntyre, it would seem counterproductive to use a line of 
reasoning which MacIntyre would dispute for methodological reasons before actually arriving at the 
substance of the critique.  Past critics of MacIntyre have not failed to notice weaknesses of his state 
theory and have highlighted it in their evaluations, yet because they come from various perspectives 
themselves and employ various methods of inquiry, they often interpret differently what exactly is 
problematic.  Those critics whom I have selected can easily be divided into three groups: (1) those 
who believe MacIntyre to be a communitarian of the modern, post-Enlightenment variety, (2) those 
who believe that MacIntyre’s theory is not necessarily opposed to liberal principles, and (3) those 
who criticize MacIntyre more on practical and historical terms.  It is an integral part of my own 
thesis that it is this third group which most perceptively investigates MacIntyre’s theory of the state 
as they at least make the attempt to argue against MacIntyre on his own terms. 
 In their reviews of MacIntyrean politics, commentators from the first camp make the 
complaint that MacIntyre is merely one of the many communitarians (i.e. those who generally value 
social ties and community as a necessary good for humans) who came to be influential in the latter 
half of the twentieth-century.  However, the willingness of these critics to group MacIntyre within a 
single intellectual movement (even one so amorphous and ill-defined as modern communitarianism, 
characterized more by similar final positions than by similar reasoning in arriving at those positions) 
is indicative of their inability to come to terms with the radical nature of MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism.  
MacIntyre does not employ Aristotle because Aristotle’s views happen to agree with ideas which 
MacIntyre has previously formulated independently of Aristotle; on the contrary, MacIntyre arrives 
at Aristotle only after having developed his interpretive theory of tradition-dependent rationality.5  
                                                           
5 MacIntyre believes that reason cannot be exercised outside of a tradition of thought; therefore, there is no neutral 
position (free from all traditions) from which we may begin reasoning.  We are dependent upon previous thought for 
providing the premises by which we reason; see below “History, Philosophy,  Method.” 
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From there onward, he at least purports to argue from Aristotelian premises.  Thus, because these 
critics fail to understand MacIntyre’s theory of tradition-dependent rationality, they misinterpret his 
proposals as being inspired by the “Romantic, counter-Enlightenment” rather than by Aristotle.6   
 If MacIntyre is not a communitarian in the sense described above, then it is possible that he 
might be more liberal than he himself realizes.7  This is the contention of Keith Breen and Thaddeus 
Kozinski, yet beyond being of the second category of critics, there is no common ground between 
these two authors.  Breen evidently hopes that MacIntyre will embrace certain aspects of liberalism 
or at least desist from attacks on the liberal tradition which “[border] awkwardly on the hyperbolic.”8  
On the other hand, Kozinski is a radical communitarian who sees MacIntyre’s (esoteric) liberalism as 
a weakness which must be dispensed with if any true realization of the political ideal is to be 
achieved.  In both cases, the authors again fail to understand how MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism and 
his aversion to liberalism have been shaped by his beliefs on how philosophical inquiry should be 
conducted.  For example, Breen’s suggestion that MacIntyre incorporate liberal principles into his 
Aristotelianism is exactly the kind of philosophical argument which MacIntyre thinks is misguided.  
One cannot pick and choose tenets of an intellectual tradition and graft them onto another; such 
principles cannot easily be detached from their original tradition and carried over into another 
without bringing additional baggage which will complicate the internal unity of a single tradition.  A 
mixture of liberalism and Aristotelianism would be inconceivable to MacIntyre if carried out in the 
cut-and-paste way which Breen suggests. 
                                                           
6 Philip Pettit, “Liberal/Communitarian: MacIntyre’s Mesmeric Dichotomy” in After MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and 
Susan Mendus (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 185. 
7 By liberal, neither MacIntyre nor I mean liberal strictly in the American sense, i.e. as being synonymous with 
progressive, although American liberals would certainly come be included within the ‘liberal’ category.  MacIntyre, I 
believe, would find most political parties in nearly all Western societies as incorporating ‘liberal’ elements in the sense 
that they all to some extent evolved out of the concern with the preservation of individual freedom and natural rights. 
8 Keith Breen, “Alasdair MacIntyre and the Hope for a Politics of Virtuous Acknowledged Dependence” in Contemporary 
Political Theory 1, no. 2 (2002), 193. 
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 Those who critique MacIntyre above do not fully understand the different aspects of his 
whole philosophy and thus fail to acknowledge certain historical arguments from MacIntyre for his 
various positions.  Such failings are less often found in the reviews by Thomas Hibbs and Gordon 
Graham of MacIntyre’s political teaching.  These authors either focus on the Aristotelian tradition or 
premises clearly articulated by MacIntyre; thus, they take a different approach than the previous 
critics in working from within MacIntyre’s own intellectual tradition rather than launching attacks 
from without.  Therefore, in my own treatment of MacIntyre, I have found this last approach most 
helpful in determining how to best present criticisms and recommendations for MacIntyre’s theory 
of the state.  However, although Hibbs and Graham are instructive as examples, they often fail to 
develop in great depth how their argument is in accordance with MacIntyre’s own standards of how 
philosophical argumentation should proceed.  I, therefore, hope to build upon what they have begun 
in identifying of what exactly MacIntyre’s method consists.  What is obvious at first glance is that 
MacIntyre heavily relies on historical authors to justify his present positions.  It therefore seems 
fitting to turn toward a discussion of the relationship between history and philosophical 
argumentation, specifically, the way in which MacIntyre himself understands this relationship 
(denoted by what I have called tradition-dependent rationality) and how this understanding shapes his 
own philosophical method. 
HI STORY ,  PH ILOSOPHY ,  METHOD  
 History and philosophy have coexisted more or less in forms recognizably similar to their 
current embodiments since their emergence in the classical Greek world.  One does not usually 
pause to consider whether Plato was a philosopher nor ask whether Herodotus or Thucydides wrote 
historical accounts; such propositions are not considered to be in doubt.  Nonetheless, despite 
displaying continuity between their respective ancient, medieval, and modern forms, the relationship 
between history and philosophy themselves has for a large part of their existence been one of 
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antagonism or disinterest.  The philosophical response to historical enquiry was for some time based 
upon Aristotle’s dismissal of history as being less scientific than poetry, “a mere collection of 
empirical facts.”9  For their part, the Greek historians did not seem concerned to justify their 
enterprise on a philosophic basis; Herodotus and Thucydides undoubtedly identified trends in 
history, but such identifications were limited as universal statements by the variability of the 
historical world.  It was not until the late eighteenth century when philosophers began to take an 
increasing interest in the nature of historical studies, seeking to establish history as a science through 
philosophical argument.  The nineteenth century completed the transformation of earlier historical 
practice, believed to be a mere recitation of past facts, into History, the realm of human thought and 
activity governed by universal laws, giving rise to the “familiar saying that the great intellectual work 
of the nineteenth century was the discovery of history.”10 
It is therefore striking that in an age which is heir to this discovery, scant attention is devoted 
to mediating the relationship between philosophy and history.  One would be hard-pressed, I think, 
to find in a historical monograph or even a more comprehensive historical study a clearly formulated 
statement on the respective tasks of these two disciplines in interpreting the conceptual world of a 
past thinker.  Whether one should ask ‘what did X think,’ ‘was X correct in thinking as he did,’ or 
yet some combination of both, largely depends on how a scholar answers the pressing questions 
surrounding philosophical historiography.  MacIntyre himself addresses this issue in proposing what 
he feels to be a false choice: 
Either we read the philosophies of the past so as to make them relevant to our contemporary 
problems and enterprises, transmuting them as far as possible into what they would have been if 
they were part of present-day philosophy, and minimizing or ignoring or even on occasion 
misrepresenting that which refuses such transmutation because it is inextricably bound up with 
                                                           
9 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, ed. Jan van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24. 
10 John Dewey, “Self-Saver or Frankenstein?” in The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 6 
(Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 280. 
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that in the past which makes it radically different from present-day philosophy; or instead we take 
great care to read them in their own terms, carefully preserving their idiosyncratic and specific 
character, so that they cannot emerge into the present except as a set of museum pieces.11 
For multiple reasons, a full discussion of these issues can hardly be carried out within the pages of 
this paper.  Nonetheless, as noted above, I feel it incumbent upon myself to address such questions 
in a satisfactory manner, not only for the provision of a rough methodological framework, but also 
for the demonstration of the intimate connection between MacIntyre’s historicism and his 
political/moral philosophy. 
 It is a great shame that in Anglo-American political thought, the term ‘historicism’ has 
entered into English usage though the works of the Karl Popper and Leo Strauss, both of whom 
deplore it as the forerunner of tyranny and nihilism.  The term itself originated in nineteenth century 
Germany to describe an intellectual movement among historians and historically-minded 
philosophers, yet a brief reading of Strauss and Popper will demonstrate that they are clearly 
describing different phenomena to their English-speaking audiences.  Popper defines historicism as 
“an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is [its] principal aim,”12 a 
definition which hardly does justice to the actual historicist movement in Germany.  The selection of 
“historical prediction” as the definitive mark of historicism demonstrates that Popper’s concern is 
not with historicism proper but with the Marxist belief that history will predictably unfold in a 
certain way, ultimately ending in a communist society.  Strauss, as a German immigrant to the 
United States, is undoubtedly much nearer than Popper to the mark in his treatment of what the 
Germans understood to be Historismus (held by Friedrich Meinecke to be nothing less than “eine der 
                                                           
11 Alasdair Macintyre, “The relationship of philosophy to its past” in Philosophy in History: Essays in Philosophical 
Historiography, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 
31. 
12 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 1999), 3. 
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größten geistigen Revolutionen, die das abendländische Denken erlebt hat”13).  For Strauss, historicism implies 
that “all philosophizing essentially belongs to ‘a historical world,’ ‘culture,’ ‘civilization,’ 
‘Weltanschauung,’”14 yet his account of historicism is skewed by a deeply polemical tone.  These 
conflicting and antagonistic presentations of historicism in political thought coupled with the advent 
of New Historicism in literary theory, a school of thought which employs the term but bears little 
resemblance to the original historicism, renders it nearly incomprehensible.  A corrective is therefore 
necessary before attempting to locate MacIntyre within a coherent, unified historicist tradition. 
 Historicism might best be defined as the recognition that “everything in the human world - 
culture, values, institutions, practices, rationality - is made by history, so that nothing has an eternal 
form, permanent essence or constant identity which transcends historical change.”15  Leo Strauss 
makes the claim that “[t]he thoughts that guided the historical school were very far from being of a 
purely theoretical character.  The historical school emerged in reaction to the French Revolution and 
to the natural right doctrines that had prepared that cataclysm.”16  Such a description of historicism 
(or the historical school) is inadequate in that it explains the rise of historicism as being due mainly 
to an emotional reaction to an historical event rather than a logical progression of thought.  Strauss’s 
reason for the above account of historicism’s emergence is perhaps related to his effort to appear as 
though he is defending the legitimacy of modern natural rights against the stultifying effect of 
historicism on modern thought (as noted above, Strauss believes historicism is to blame for many of 
the woes of the modern world).  By claiming that the early historicists were unreflective disciples of 
Burke and de Maistre (i.e. conservatives who valued tradition for tradition’s sake after the horrors of 
the French Revolution), Strauss can ignore the actual theoretical concerns of Herder, Schelling, 
Schleiermacher, and others who were behind the genesis of the historical school.  If Strauss were to 
                                                           
13 “One of the greatest intellectual revolutions which Western thought has experienced.” Friedrich Meinecke, Die 
Entstehung des Historismus, vol. 1 (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1936), 1. 
14 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 12. 
15 Frederick Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 2. 
16 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 13. 
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admit the legitimacy of Herder’s discovery that thought and reason are dependent upon one’s 
particular language and culture (a fundamental belief of the historicists), it might call into question 
the ability of reason to find truths that apply universally to people of various cultures and languages.  
Among what had previously been considered universal and rational norms is included the modern 
belief in natural rights, to say nothing of the sentiments expressed in the Declaration of 
Independence which Strauss professes to defend.  Strauss is more correct in maintaining that 
historicism is not, or (more properly) should not be, supported simply by historical evidence17; one 
sees such an approach in the naïve historical or cultural relativism of the anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict, for example.  In other words, the observation that cultures throughout time and place 
differ from one another in their beliefs and practices does not justify the rejection of possible 
universal truths; one of these cultures may have ‘true’ beliefs or could discover ‘true’ beliefs despite 
the fact that others disagree with them.  Mature historicism, on the other hand, is rooted in a 
philosophic critique of eighteenth-century trust in universal truths and thus bases its thesis of the 
historicization of thought on philosophic principles rather than the observation of differing cultures.  
 Those English-speaking scholars who subscribe to the teachings of the historical school 
often find fault with analytic philosophy18 for being insufficiently historical in its outlook.  The 
analytic school, it is suggested, has a bifurcated view of philosophical history due to its assumption 
that modern philosophical analysis of language has swept aside all previous forms of philosophy.  
Therefore, a description of how past philosophers understood themselves is relegated completely to 
the realm of history; it has no utility for the modern philosophical enterprise.19  However, Charles 
Taylor grants to the analytics a certain use of past philosophers: “Past authors may be read, but they 
                                                           
17 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 9-10. 
18 Philosophical school predominantly in America and Britain which emphasizes the importance of logic and the 
philosophy of language. 
19 Cf. John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 329: “We 
don’t study [Hume, Leibniz, and Kant] in the hope of finding some philosophical argument, some analytic idea that will 
be directly useful for our present-day philosophical questions in the way they arise for us.  No, we study Hume, Leibniz, 
and Kant because they express deep and distinctive philosophical doctrines.”  
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are treated as if they were contemporaries.  They earn a right to enter the dialogue because they 
happen to offer good formulations of one or another position which is worthy of a hearing.  They 
are not explored as origins, but as atemporal resources.”20  Returning to the two options as 
formulated by MacIntyre, it would seem that the analytics are interested only in the former option of 
reading authors anachronistically - they do not quite care how the authors understood themselves.  
However, the complaint expressed by MacIntyre and Taylor is not a novel one, having been made 
previously against the ‘realists’ by R.G. Collingwood. 
 Collingwood identifies the realist school as a group of Oxford philosophy professors who 
maintained that one simply apprehends basic truths about the real world.21  His objections to the 
‘realists’ stemmed from their inability to grasp essential differences between concepts at varying 
points in history; their historical myopia in discussing the definition of the state, ‘ought’, matter, and 
causation was tantamount to translating the Greek τριήρης (trireme) as ‘steamer’.  In Collingwood’s 
mind, they simply could not conceive that Platonic terminology, as understood by Plato, was not 
easily integrated into the realist discourse of the state: “Take Plato’s Republic and Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, so far as they are concerned with politics.  Obviously the political theories they set forth 
are not the same.  But do they represent two different theories of the same thing?”22  The question 
posed here asks whether Hobbes and Plato (and ultimately the modern reader) participate in a 
conversation about what political arrangement is the best or rationally justified for human beings at 
all times and in all places.  On the one hand, it might be misguided to make the claim that Plato, as 
an ancient Greek, could never conceive of the Hobbesian state, or that Hobbes, as a seventeenth-
century Englishman, could never understand what Plato meant in describing the Greek city-state.  
The acknowledgement that authors are able to understand concepts foreign to their own era might 
                                                           
20 Charles Taylor, “Philosophy and its history” in Philosophy in History: Essays in Philosophical Historiography, ed. Richard 
Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 17. 
21 R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 25-27. 
22 Collingwood, Autobiography, 61. 
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justify a certain amount of optimism that Plato and Hobbes were aware of multiple alternatives to a 
single problem and thus were providing different accounts of the ideal politics.  On the other hand, 
although we should not deny Plato the ability to conceive what is expressed in Hobbes’s formulation 
of the state, it would seem that political arrangement offered by the Hobbesian state would be 
irrelevant to the problems of his own time.  Plato’s Republic was an answer to concerns from his own 
era; Hobbes was also providing an answer to contemporary questions with his description of the 
state in Leviathan.  It is then doubtful whether they are indeed providing answers to the same 
question.  Collingwood answered as follows: 
Can you say that the Republic gives one account of ‘the nature of the State’ and the Leviathan 
another?  No; because Plato’s ‘State’ is the Greek πόλις, and Hobbes’s is the absolutist State of the 
seventeenth century.  The ‘realist’ answer is easy: certainly Plato’s State is different from 
Hobbes’s, but they are both States; so the theories are theories of the State.  Indeed, what did 
you mean by calling them both political, if not that they were theories of the same thing? 
 It was obvious to me that this was only a piece of logical bluff, and that if instead of 
logic-chopping you got down to brass tacks and called for definitions of the ‘State’ as Plato 
conceived it and as Hobbes conceived it, you would find that the differences between them were 
not superficial but went down to essentials.23 
From these observations and further study, Collingwood was convinced that all questions arise from 
one’s historical situation and thus deduced that there are no perennial problems of philosophy, a 
deduction which the realists (and Strauss) apparently dispute.  To believe in ‘eternal problems’ is to 
ignore a reality in which all problems are generated from one’s socio-historical context.  Yet for 
those who believe in eternal problems or the analytics who “take themselves to be the first to have 
understood what philosophy is,”24 it would seem that the charges of historical inaccuracy can only 
                                                           
23 Collingwood, Autobiography, 61. 
24 Richard Rorty et al., “Introduction” in Philosophy in History: Essays in Philosophical Historiography, ed. Richard Rorty et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 11. 
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go so far in convincing them that their approach is philosophically unsound.  Many major analytic 
philosophers are known for maintaining propositions which oftentimes directly contradict the 
fundamental premises of the historicist outlook; Gottlob Frege, the father of analytic philosophy, 
reacted against Herder’s theory of language-dependent thought, “backing off from the bold claim 
that thought is essentially dependent on and abounded by language and substituting for it the weaker 
claim that the dependence in question is only a contingent feature of the thought of human 
beings.”25  Thus, although the arguments for historicism are hardly universally accepted, for those 
who wish to synthesize historical and philosophical concerns, the historicism of Taylor, MacIntyre, 
and Collingwood presents an attractive alternative. 
 Since he understood the nature of reason (and thus truth) to be largely determined by one’s 
historical situation, R.G. Collingwood aimed to have the philosophical question of truth be 
subsumed under the historical question of accuracy, that is, accuracy in determining what past 
peoples and thinkers believed to be true.  However, this does not mean that the historical scholar is 
also unable to ask whether a certain view is correct: “But this did not mean that the question ‘was 
Plato right to think as he did on such and such a question?’ was to be left unanswered.  As well 
suggest that the question ‘was Phormio right to row round the Corinthians’ circle?’ must be left 
unanswered because it goes outside the province of naval history, whose only concern with Phormio 
is to find out what he did.  What lunatic idea of history is this, which would imply that it is history 
that Phormio rowed round the Corinthians, but not that he beat the Corinthians by doing it?”26  For 
Collingwood, history (which he defined as being solely the history of thought27) is a continuous 
series of questions and answers.  In order to judge whether Plato was correct in answering as he did, 
the scholar must judge whether he answered the question correctly as he understood it.  It thus 
                                                           
25 Michael N. Forster, After Herder (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1-2; John Haldane, “MacIntyre’s Thomist 
Revival: What Next?” in After MacIntyre, ed. John Horton and Susan Mendus (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994), 95; Taylor, “Philosophy and its history,” 18-19. 
26 Collingwood, Autobiography, 72. 
27 Ibid., 110. 
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follows that history is a re-enactment of past thoughts: “Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of 
a past thought encapsulated in a context of present thoughts which, by contradicting it, confine it to 
a plane different from theirs.”28  Collingwood rejects the positivistic aim of Leopold von Ranke to 
describe history ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ (‘as it actually was’), for by that method, one is bound to treat 
history as though it were a natural science.  One collects individual historical ‘facts,’ e.g. ‘Aristotle 
was the son of Nicomachus’ or ‘Tiberius was the second emperor of Rome.’  Yet if the analogy is 
with natural science, one is then unable to pass judgment on a set of discrete historical facts; one 
does not judge whether or not it is good that water is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen 
molecules.  Thus Collingwood proposes instead an organic view of historical thought where “a 
process P1 turns into a process P2” as it travels through the question-answer paradigm; if history is 
process which continually morphs through a series of questions and answers, Collingwood believes 
that the historian is able to render judgment on whether a certain development in history was 
justified.29 
 Strauss’s response to Collingwood in his article “On Collingwood’s Philosophy of History” 
is expectedly antagonistic, so much so that Strauss frequently misreads Collingwood and attributes 
views to him with which Collingwood explicitly disagrees.30  Nonetheless, Strauss raises questions 
about Collingwood, which if anything aid the acquisition of a richer understanding of Collingwood’s 
philosophy.  Strauss is mainly concerned with Collingwood’s ability to pass judgment on what is 
progress and what is decay in history.  Certainly, if history is rational, it would seem that every 
decision is progressive in light of the fact that historical actors succeed in answering the questions of 
their age in a rational manner.  Collingwood himself indicates this: “The present is our own 
                                                           
28 Collingwood, Autobiography, 114. 
29 Ibid., 98. 
30 As an example, Strauss claims that “Collingwood’s attitude towards the thought of the past was in fact that of a 
spectator who sees from the outside the relation of an earlier thought to its time” (575).  This is a gross 
mischaracterization of Collingwood’s doctrine of reenactment which expressly denies that we can interpret the past as an 
objective, external spectator.   See R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, 282-302. 
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activities; we are carrying out these activities as well as we know how; and consequently, from the 
point of view of the present, there must always be a coincidence between what is and what ought to 
be, the actual and the ideal.  The Greeks were trying to be Greeks; the Middle Ages were trying to be 
medieval; the aim of every age is to be itself; and thus the present is always perfect in the sense that 
it always succeeds in being what it is trying to be.”31   
Nonetheless, there is also room for the historian to judge certain historical trends as 
progressive or decadent by applying the standards of his own era.  In writing of the historian 
Tacitus, Collingwood discerns “defeatist philosophies which, starting from the assumption that the 
good man cannot conquer or control a wicked world, taught him how to preserve himself unspotted 
from its wickedness … Tacitus has attempted a new approach, the psychological-didactic; but 
instead of being an enrichment of historical method this is really an impoverishment, and indicates a 
declining standard of historical honesty.”32  Whether or not Collingwood is correct in his description 
of Tacitus, Strauss finds it evident that Collingwood does not understand that the political situation 
in which Tacitus lived might indeed have been a ‘wicked world’ because Collingwood excludes “the 
possibility of unqualified decay.”33  Therefore, Collingwood is too hasty in passing judgment on 
Tacitus, ignoring the legitimate political reasons for the way in which he wrote history.  Strauss is 
undoubtedly correct in noting that Collingwood is perhaps lax in applying his own standards of re-
enactment (for example, coming to understand why Tacitus wrote in the way that he did), yet that 
does not preclude the historian from then judging the methods of the past historian by the standards 
of his own era.    And there is one proposition in Collingwood which seems to take on a nearly 
absolute character by which all history must be judged: the truth of scientific history or historicism 
itself. 
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 The problematic nature of this aspect of Collingwood’s philosophy is not explicitly noted by 
Strauss in his review essay.  It is what Strauss understands to be Nietzsche’s historicization of 
historicism which radically undercuts the universal outlook that historicism ascribes to itself, thus 
resulting in radical historicism.  As noted previously, historicism made the philosophical claim that 
there were no universal truths: all ‘truths’ were derived from one’s reason, which in turn was limited 
by one’s language and culture.  However, if historicism claims that all thought is historical, then the 
idea of historicism itself must not be exempted from this judgment.  Historicism is not a universally 
valid truth, but one which emerged from a certain cultural context, namely, western European 
culture: 
The radical historicist refuses to admit the trans-historical character of the historicist thesis.  At 
the same time he recognizes the absurdity of unqualified historicism as a theoretical thesis.  He 
denies, therefore, the possibility of a theoretical or objective analysis, which as such would be 
trans-historical, of the various comprehensive views or ‘historical worlds’ or ‘cultures.’  This 
denial was decisively prepared by Nietzsche’s attack on nineteenth-century historicism, which 
claimed to be a theoretical view …. 
The thesis of radical historicism can be stated as follows.  All understanding, all 
knowledge, however limited and ‘scientific,’ presupposes a frame of reference; it presupposes a 
horizon, a comprehensive view within which understanding and knowing take place.  Only such 
a comprehensive vision makes possible any seeing, any observation, any orientation.  The 
comprehensive view of the whole cannot be validated by reasoning, since it is the basis of all 
reasoning.  Accordingly, there is a variety of such comprehensive views, each as legitimate as any 
other: we have to choose such a view without any rational guidance.34 
Under a historicist framework, Collingwood was able to argue against the thesis that “the isolation 
of the various cultures is as complete as that of the Leibnitian [sic] monads.”35  Put simply, 
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Collingwood believed that the methodology of re-enactment supplied by historicism allowed one to 
understand different cultural viewpoints and see them all as expressions of the same rational 
process.  All human thought, whether it be Athenian or Andean, forms a unified whole which is 
accessible to the historian.  Yet when it is realized that historicism does not stand above the various 
viewpoints but is itself one viewpoint among others, no unifying principle is present to judge among 
the various Weltanschauungen.  It would seem that there is nothing to prevent a complete descent into 
nihilism, or rather the realization that no belief is more or less rationally justifiable than any other.  
Every philosophical or methodological system is just one view among many, and there is no possible 
way of judging which is correct. 
 MacIntyre’s theory of tradition-dependent reasoning is, in many ways, an answer to those 
who believe that the inevitable endpoint of historicism is indeed nihilism, opposing his theory to 
those of Nietzschean relativists such as Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty (who do indeed maintain 
that there is no standard of rationality by which one can justify believing that one view is more true 
than another).36  For despite the fact that Collingwood’s historicism cannot remain preserved in toto 
after Nietzsche, MacIntyre continues to claim that, with regard to historical enquiry, “my own 
greatest debt in this area was to R.G. Collingwood, although my understanding of the nature and 
complexity of traditions I owe most of all to J.H. Newman.”37 The main differentiating point 
between Collingwood and MacIntyre is that the latter is quite comfortable with allowing historicism 
to be one view among many rather than considering it to be the universally true view.  On the other 
hand, MacIntyre also affirms that there is yet a way of judging between seemingly incommensurable 
rival traditions or viewpoints. 
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 The first step in the evaluation of another tradition is “to come to understand what it is to 
think in the terms prescribed by that particular rival tradition, to learn how to think as if one were a 
convinced adherent of that rival tradition.”38  In so doing, one might be able to identify problems 
and incoherencies within the tradition as understood by that tradition.  Once identified, “rational 
superiority is to be found in the circumstances in which one tradition explains the persistent 
difficulties encountered by another better than the other can itself, and in ways that the adherents of 
the less successful tradition can recognize.”39  It is for these reasons that MacIntyre can do what 
Collingwood could not, namely “consider the possibility that progress may consist in separating 
recent achievements from their present framework and integrating them into an earlier framework 
which must be recovered by historical knowledge proper.”40  MacIntyre’s rejection of the modern 
‘liberal’ tradition and subsequent integration of Aristotelianism with a philosophy of history is just 
such of an example of constructing a tradition out of past frameworks and present ‘achievements’ in 
order to avoid the difficulties faced by another tradition. 
 Questions must arise, though, when MacIntyre’s thought comes under closer examination; 
one such question is “how are masters of a tradition to ascertain what the story of their tradition is 
and their place in it?”41  Secondly, MacIntyre does not discuss in great detail how one comes to 
interpret the language of another except through a historical interpretation.  He does not seem to 
account adequately for those traditions which may not conceive reason as being historical, i.e. 
embedded in a historical culture and language, thus entailing a rejection on their part of any 
historical ‘explanation’ of their current problems.  MacIntyre’s response to the latter objection would 
be founded in the observation that “the discontinuities of incommensurability [occur] within a 
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framework of continuity”; although each tradition may differ in its questions and rationality, they 
largely deal with the same subject matter, providing some common ground through which dialogue 
and interpretation is made possible.42  One is able to learn the language of another tradition because 
there are certain areas of resemblance which provide a sufficient amount of continuity between 
otherwise incommensurable worldviews.   
 In addition to the continuity described above, most traditions would allow, I think, that 
rationality, regardless of the exact form it takes, is expressed generally in answers to questions that 
occur through time.  Therefore, many traditions understand that they have arrived at their present 
beliefs through a series of theoretical modifications that took place in the past; as an example, 
modern libertarians might look back to John Locke, Ayn Rand, Friedrich von Hayek and other past 
libertarian-minded thinkers as paving the way to their present position.  Even so, if the advocates of 
one tradition feel that they have ‘solved’ the problems of another, MacIntyre does allow that “the 
protagonists of a defeated tradition may not recognize, and may not be able to recognize, that such a 
defeat has occurred.”43  In no way does this lessen the fact that the dissolution of a rival tradition 
and its absorption into another was legitimate and rationally justified.  There may be those who 
consider themselves as wholly original thinkers, not being located within any particular tradition; 
they maintain that their beliefs are simply ‘true,’ have not developed through time, and will not 
continue to develop.  The question then becomes whether it is legitimate to interpret such people as 
belonging to a historical tradition even if they do not realize that they are part of a tradition.  Since 
MacIntyre holds that it is legitimate to interpret such people as belonging to a tradition, he can be 
criticized as ascribing to a crypto-Hegelianism, i.e. despite denying a belief in an absolute and 
universal standpoint, he treats the concept of a ‘tradition’ as if it is universally applicable and should 
be recognized as such by all traditions.  In response to this criticism, MacIntyre affirms to the 
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contrary that “the concept of a tradition, together with the criteria for its use and application, is itself 
one developed from within one particular tradition-based standpoint.”44  With regard to the question 
of how to define what belongs within a tradition, the definition of tradition must be internal to the 
tradition which has generated the concept of tradition itself; therefore, the tradition which invents 
the concept of a ‘tradition’ may proceed in defining what is part of its own tradition but also how 
other traditions are constituted (such as, the liberal tradition, the Confucian tradition, the 
Augustinian tradition, etc.), even if such schools of thought do not consider themselves to be 
traditions. 
 Having arrived at a picture of what a MacIntyrean approach to philosophical historiography 
might look like, it is now for me to elaborate its significance for the large majority of this paper.  
Primarily, the above reflections have determined the approach I have taken toward the 
interpretation of Aristotle and other Greek thinkers.  Instead of seeking to elicit from these thinkers 
certain propositions which might answer the demands of modern logic (or worse yet, imposing such 
logical structures upon ancient and medieval texts), I have attempted to read these authors as being 
members of “socially, culturally and intellectually alien periods in the history of philosophy.”45  This 
does not imply that these authors were mindlessly reporting the customs of their age, yet their 
position in history did provide a framework within which they carried on their philosophizing.   By 
appropriating MacIntyre’s idea of ‘traditions’ for my own analysis of past thought, I have found a 
way in which I can satisfactorily address the normative concerns of a political theorist as well as the 
historical aims of a classical historian.  Nonetheless, I am limited in this aim for reasons of space; 
although some historians of philosophy have queried whether Aristotle’s ethical theory is detachable 
from his metaphysics or biology, I will not be able to delve into a treatment of his metaphysics  
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(although I doubt that for Aristotle it would be possible to so easily separate politics and ethics from 
metaphysics and biology as they are different facets of a rational whole).  I therefore will restrict my 
remarks to their views on the ‘State’ (however that might be conceived), trying to understand it in 
context as best as I am able.  Secondly, MacIntyre’s theory of tradition in itself is intimately tied up 
with his ethical and political theories in that “his account goes beyond Aristotelianism precisely in its 
appeal to history.”46 One cannot critique MacIntyre’s own theory of the state, as I wish to do, 
without realizing that his theory of the state is the summation of his own tradition.  A philosophical 
critique of MacIntyre’s state theory is therefore at least partly a historical critique.   
THE  AR I STOTEL IAN  TRAD IT ION  
 Having established that a thorough treatment of MacIntyre’s own state theory cannot be 
accomplished without the rational structure of an historical tradition, I find it necessary to define 
what constitutes the tradition within which MacIntyre places himself.  In both After Virtue and Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre begins his investigation of the Aristotelian tradition with the 
Greek Dark Ages (1200-800 B.C.) and closes with Aquinas, albeit with notable gaps in the historical 
narrative.  In the process of explaining how MacIntyre comes to articulate his theory of the state, I 
will therefore draw only upon those periods which MacIntyre himself discusses, with a heavy 
emphasis on Aristotle.  Additionally, although MacIntyre does consider himself a Thomist, I find 
that his theory of the state can largely be understood by appealing directly to Aristotelian 
philosophy; the inclusion of Thomas Aquinas is thus rendered to be unnecessary for my own 
purposes.  Nonetheless, in being guided by the chronological parameters set by MacIntyre, I will not 
merely repeat what he has already said about the historical narrative; instead, I will seek to buttress 
his own argument by drawing upon pertinent historical examples which he has not included in his 
writings.  As outlined in the previous section, a tradition must seek to build upon all that has 
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historically shaped the thoughts of key thinkers of that tradition; therefore, by investigating certain 
authors and texts within tradition more closely than MacIntyre does, I hope to show that MacIntyre 
ignores certain teachings which are essential to a full understanding of the Aristotelian tradition. 
 Our two main sources for life at the end of the Greek Dark Ages are the poets Hesiod and 
Homer.  Hesiod, in Works and Days, provides modern readers with a unique glance into the society 
and beliefs of Greece in the eighth century B.C.  Homer differs from Hesiod in that he is clearly 
attempting to describe a society which existed some time before him, yet “aspects of that imaginary 
world - its interests, passions, ideologies, and to some degree its social institutions - must have 
conformed to [his] audience’s real-life experiences.”47  As both Hesiod and Homer indicate, Greek 
society was under the control of rulers called, in Epic Greek, βασιλς (basilēs).  Although this term 
underwent a great deal of evolution (by the Byzantine Era, it means ‘emperor’), it apparently first 
meant something comparable to ‘chieftain.’  In such a society, constant warfare was common: “raids 
not only enrich[ed] the raid leader and his men, but also serve[d] as a test of their manliness, skill, 
and courage, and thus [brought] honor and glory.”48  It was in this milieu that concepts of justice 
and goodness were, unsurprisingly, tied intimately to ideals of warfare.  Damaging another’s honor 
must be answered by retribution on the part of the injured party.  Such a system of retribution falls 
under the dominion of Zeus, who not only legitimates or brings about retribution but justifies the 
rule of the βασιλς, for it is Zeus who has marked out the natural and social order of the world.  In 
this world, two Greek terms were of great importance in determining not only what is just but also 
how to proceed when the prescribed order of the world has been in some sense ruptured: θέµις 
(themis) and δίκη (dikē).  Both words, as noted by MacIntyre, come from verbal roots, the former 
from τίθεναι (tithenai) “to put, place” and the latter from δεικνύναι (deiknunai) “to show, make 
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known.”49  With this in mind, we might define ‘θέµις’ as the order which has been decreed or ‘put in 
place’ by the gods, most importantly Zeus, and ‘δίκη’ as the manifestation and enforcement of that 
order.  The chieftains perform a fundamental role in this order, having been entrusted by Zeus with 
the ‘θέµιστες’ (themistes), those divinely ordained “customs, usages, principles of justice.”50  However, 
the gods also ensure that the chieftains themselves adhere to the divine ‘θέµιστες’ for “ο βί εν 
γορ σκολις κρίνωσι θέµιστας, κ δ δίκην λάσωσι θεν πιν οκ λέγοντες” are punished 
with floods and tempests.51 
 It is of course the case that people will not always be in violation of the divine order of 
society; they will often adhere to the expectations of one in their respective social position.  The 
Greek Dark Ages thus provides us with type of moral vocabulary (for example, ‘good’ and ‘virtue’) 
which would continue to be used in Aristotelian philosophy.  MacIntyre describes the relationship 
between positive ethical terms with the concept of δίκη as follows: 
To do what my role requires, to do it well, deploying the skills necessary to discharge what 
someone in that role owes to others, is to be agathos.  ‘Agathos’ comes to be translatable by ‘good’ 
and ‘aretē’, the corresponding noun, by ‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’; but since originally to be agathos is 
to be good at doing what one’s role requires, and since the primary all-important role is that of 
the warrior-king, it is unsurprising that ‘aretē’ originally names the excellence of such a king … 
‘Aretē’ comes, of course, to be used of qualities other than those of warrior-kings, but in the 
Homeric poems it still names only qualities which enable an individual to do what his or her role 
requires.  Yet these are qualities praised not only because they enable an individual to do what his 
or her role requires, but also because they enable one both to act in accordance with what his or 
her role requires and to preserve and restore dikē.52 
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Thus, to be good or γαθς (agathos) is to be successful in fulfilling a certain role.  As the role of a 
warrior was most important during this period, it is hardly surprising that the term continued to have 
the possible meaning of ‘courageous’ through the classical period.53  Additionally, the corresponding 
noun, ‘ἀρετὴ’ (aretē) is itself related to the adjective ‘ἄρσην’ (arsēn), ‘masculine,’ thus indicating that 
qualities of masculinity and physical strength were valued above all else.  Nonetheless, although 
MacIntyre is undoubtedly correct in maintaining that these terms pertained mostly to the virtues of 
warriors, one should note that in the Odyssey, Penelope claims for herself a certain ἀρετὴ, 
demonstrating that even in the time of Homer the term was beginning to be used for roles other 
than that of a male warrior.54 
 Hesiod’s concern in the Works and Days is less grand than those of Achilles and Hector, yet 
his account of the laziness of his brother Perses as well as the injustice of the local βασιλς draws 
on generally the same Weltanschauung as that of Homer.  He was neither one of the chieftains nor a 
person of any great social stature; instead, Hesiod was “a peasant farmer, dependent for justice on 
those whom Zeus had entrusted with the function of guarding the themistes; and when he found that 
justice was denied him, he naturally reproached the basileis with their failures to carry out their 
duties.”55  However, Hesiod elaborates on the Homeric account in two important ways.  First, he 
admonishes the chieftains or magistrates not to forget that Zeus does not fail to notice “οην δ 
κα τήνδε δίκην πόλις ντς νέργει.”56  The πόλις (polis) or ‘city-state’ becomes for Hesiod a place 
where justice is enforced; rather than being simply the decree of a chieftain of a roving band of 
warriors, ‘δίκη’ is now situated within the city.  Secondly, Hesiod makes the differentiation between 
the world of humans and the world of beasts, claiming that justice has been granted by Zeus to 
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humans and not to the beasts that eat one another.57  There is no justification provided for such a 
statement; it is obviously understood to be a self-evident statement rather than one which Hesiod 
would feel the need to defend.  Nonetheless, later writers would feel compelled to defend the notion 
that humans radically differ from animals with regard to their ethical responsibilities in response to 
those who challenged such a sentiment. 
 The abolition of the chiefdoms which defined the world of Hesiod and Homer as well as the 
emergence of a philosophic mindset among the Greeks posed a challenge for the conventional ways 
of explaining not only ‘δίκη’ but human society in general.  The Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus 
might have represented the early stages of such a challenge when he made the claim that “δίκην 
ἔριν” - that “justice is strife.”58  Heraclitus is certainly drawing on previous aspects of Greek thought: 
“As in Anaximander, Dike stands for world order, and as in Homer, she is protected by the 
Erinyes.” 59 Yet it is modified in such a way as to render previous explanations of the nature of 
justice irrelevant.  If justice, or the order of the world, is merely strife and the claims of a chieftain to 
knowledge of divine ordinances were now thoroughly discredited, there would seem to be little to 
justify belief in anything other than a purely egoistic doctrine of individual gain.  This, apparently, is 
exactly what happened among certain members of Greek society who came to be known as the 
Sophists.  Their distinction between ‘νόµος’ (nomos) and ‘φύσις’ (physis), roughly a distinction between 
positive (i.e. man-made) and natural law, aroused great interest not only among intellectuals but also 
among members of the aristocracy.  For if nature is defined by strife, there would seem to be little to 
justify the faith of Hesiod in believing there to be a radical difference between the world of beasts 
and men.  Humans have indeed invented law for themselves, yet if law is something that is merely 
conventional rather than essential for man, why should one obey, especially when doing so is outside 
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what is natural?  The ultra-conservative Aristophanes lampoons such a position in the The Clouds, 
where the youg Sophist Pheidippides says to his father, whom he wishes to physically assault: 
“σκέψαι δ τος λεκτρυόνας κα τλλα τ βοτ ταυτί, ς τος πατέρας µύνεται: καίτοι τί 
διαφέρουσιν µν κενοι, πλήν γ τι ψηφίσµατ ο γράφουσιν;”60  To which his father replies: 
“τί δτ, πειδ τος λεκτρυόνας παντα µιµε, οκ σθίεις κα τν κόπρον κπ ξύλου 
καθεύδεις;”61  Aristophanes clearly believes the position of the Sophists to be laughable, yet their 
challenge to Greek society was undeniably potent.   
 It might be instructive to pause in the historical narrative to question why the above outline 
of Greek thought and history is necessary for an understanding of Aristotle.  Certainly, the various 
positions above, such as the belief in invisible Erinyes actively exacting vengeance from humans, are 
not first principles of Aristotelian philosophy nor do they seem to relate directly to a theory of the 
state.  Nonetheless, I think it important for several reasons, three of which I list here.  First, the 
terms which we employ in language are accompanied by connotations which we tacitly understand 
to be present.  Such connotations are largely the product of that word’s history.  Therefore, in order 
to understand what ‘δίκη’ means for Aristotle, we must trace its history; by applying our own 
notions of justice to this term, we would ignore crucial aspects of its meaning in Greek thought.  
Second, insofar as I am subscribing to Collingwood’s idea of thought evolving through a series of 
questions and answers, it is necessary to formulate the ‘questions’ faced by Aristotle not simply by 
looking at his text to see which questions he explicitly states there.  Rather, we must look to the 
historical situation to see whom he was arguing against, what their exact position was, and so forth.  
Questions arise in a context rather than popping into one’s mind ex nihilo.  Finally, this brief history 
of Greek political thought up to Aristotle does not appear to include how the Greeks believed a 
                                                           
60 Aristophanes The Clouds 1427-1429; “Consider the roosters and the other beasts here, how they retaliate against their 
fathers; and how do these differ from us, except that they do not write decrees of the assembly?” 
61 Aristophanes The Clouds 1430-1431; “Well, why then, since you imitate roosters in all things, do you not eat dung and 
sleep upon a wooden beam?” 
28 
 
‘state’ ought to be constituted.  This historical summary would indeed be irrelevant to state theory if 
‘δίκη’ had remained divorced from the πόλις in Greek thought, yet as these two concepts became 
fused together in archaic Greece, we can locate a rudimentary state theory among the Greeks in that 
the legitimate state must mirror the cosmic order of justice.  Similarly, just as the individual in the 
Greek Dark Ages was a part of an organic social structure in which he or she achieved ‘ἀρετὴ’ in 
fulfilling a certain social role, the individual citizen ‘grows’ out of and finds purpose in the life of the 
πόλις.  Nonetheless, the challenge of the Sophists brought to light certain questions about the nature 
of force and power within.  Therefore, we should read Aristotle as developing and elaborating upon 
all such considerations (both of human flourishing and of the brute reality of the strife-ridden 
political world) in constructing his own theory of the state; he does not adopt these principles 
wholesale but rather attempts to reformulate them according to the dictates of reason and logic as 
he discusses them in both the Ethics and the Politics. 
 The nature of Aristotle’s ethics can be legitimately described as being eudemonistic; he is 
concerned with ‘εδαιµονία’ (eudaimonia) or what is usually translated as happiness.  Such a 
translation is lacking however, for we think of happiness now as being a particular emotional state.  
Aristotle does not intend any such meaning in his use of ‘εδαιµονία’: he equates it with “τ ε 
ζν κα τ ε πράττειν.”62  Therefore, I find a more proper translation to be ‘flourishing.’  Even 
so, granting that this is an investigation of Aristotelian ethics, one might ask what relevance this has 
for MacIntyre’s theory of the state.  Indeed, why do we not instead begin our investigation of 
Aristotle with his political observations?  Aristotle himself answers this question in a passage in the 
Politics where he writes, “πότερον δ τν εδαιµονίαν τν ατν εναι φατέον νός τε κάστου 
τν νθρώπων κα πόλεως  µ τν ατήν, λοιπόν στιν επεν. φανερν δ κα τοτο. 
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πάντες γρ ν µολογήσειαν εναι τν ατήν.”63  MacIntyre strongly echoes this belief that 
politics reflects ethics in his claim that “within the Aristotelian framework the one task [ethics] 
cannot be discharged without discharging the other [politics].”64  Whether or not all Aristotelian 
political science is simply a subcategory of ethical inquiry remains to be seen; however, MacIntyre 
clearly believes that it is.  Therefore, if one is to understand the nature of the Aristotelian (and 
MacIntyrean) ideal state, one must come to understand the meaning of ‘εδαιµονία’ for the 
individual human. 
 Such a state of flourishing for the individual is desired for its own sake for it is “κάλλιστον 
κα ριστον πάντων οσα διστον.”65  Since such is the nature of ‘εδαιµονία’, it also qualifies 
as the ultimate end of man in that the ultimate end “ν εη τγαθν κα τ ριστον.”66  Having 
established early in the Nicomachean Ethics that the ultimate end or function of man is to flourish (in 
the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle simply assumes it), he turns toward providing a definition of 
‘εδαιµονία’ which goes beyond the general idea of living well.  If flourishing is the end of man and 
the end of man is also his function, we must first determine the function of man before we can 
begin to formulate definitions.  Aristotle here invokes the question about how humans differ from 
the rest of the animal world which had been a key question for the Sophists, who are portrayed in 
Greek literature as denying any fundamental differences between beasts and mankind.  Yet unlike 
the Sophists, Aristotle finds that humans differ from animals by virtue of possessing “πρακτική τις 
το λόγον χοντος.”67 Yet by making this identification of what is unique to humans, Aristotle does 
not limit human life to this ‘function’: 
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In confining the human function to a life of action of the rational part, Aristotle does not exclude 
all animal or vegetative activities.  He assumes only that rational activity is the distinctive and 
essential feature of the human soul, and that this organizes the human being’s other activities in 
the way perception organizes a non-rational animal’s other activities.  The life of action will 
include other activities besides the activity of reasoning; but in a human being they are essentially 
guided by reasoning.68 
With this understanding of reason’s regulation of the human soul, Aristotle’s desire to provide a 
definition for ‘εδαιµονία’ can now be satisfied.  After two suggestions, he arrives at the definition 
of flourishing as “ψυχς νέργεια … κατ ρετήν.”69  The connection between this definition and 
the definition of man’s function may not be apparent; therefore, an elucidation is perhaps required.  
The term used here, ‘νέργεια’ (energeia), is derived from the Greek word for function, ργον (ergon); 
literally, it means ‘that-which-is-in-the-function’.  Hence, I have rendered it as ‘active function,’ for 
flourishing does not consist merely in passively knowing the function of man but actively exercising 
that function - participating in that function.  Additionally, this active function of the soul (i.e. the 
practical life of the part of the soul possessing reason) must be done “κατ ρετήν” or according to 
virtue.  As noted above, ‘ρετή’ in the Greek world was understood as excellence in a certain role; it 
is not something which has an existence independent of a certain role or function.  In this case, 
human flourishing is dependent upon the fulfillment of one’s function as a human being as well as 
possible, that is, with excellence.   
 As human flourishing has been defined as the active function of the soul in accordance with 
most perfect virtue, it is necessary to delineate the parts of the soul in order to understand its 
function.  There is a division between the vegetative, appetitive, and rational parts of the soul; the 
similarity to Plato’s tripartite division of the soul should be apparent.  However, Aristotle asserts that 
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the appetitive is not wholly irrational, for it can be governed by rational principle.  Since the human 
function is intimately connected with the rational part, virtue consists of two main parts: that which 
is concerned with the excellence of the rational part itself (intellectual virtue) and that which is 
concerned with the rational part’s governance of the appetites (ethical virtue).  The latter is titled 
‘ethical’ because it is formed through ‘θος’ (ethos) or habit; in contrast, the intellectual virtues are 
cultivated through instruction and teaching.  However, ethical habituation is not a straightforward 
process where one need only repeat certain actions before one becomes fully ‘habituated’.  Instead, a 
dialectical process, involving two elements which continually modify and improve upon the other, is 
necessary for the formation of ethical virtue, a process which is dependent upon the intellectual virtue 
of ‘φρονήσις’ (phronēsis), meaning ‘prudence.’   
 MacIntyre makes explicit what is here in Aristotle only implied, that is, that the “exercise of 
independent practical reasoning is one essential constituent to full human flourishing.”70  Since the 
ideal political community will aim to make human flourishing possible, it is by this standard, or 
rather, by the extent each ‘politics’ allows for citizens to deliberate over the relative status of goods 
as determined by their practical reasoning powers (i.e. Aristotle’s ‘φρονήσις’), that various political 
regimes are to be measured and judged.  This is especially crucial as man cannot develop φρονήσις 
independently of the πόλις.  Since Aristotle considers it impossible to be self-sufficient as an 
individual71, a man cannot detach himself from society unless he is a god or wishes to descend to the 
level of the beasts (for, outside of society, he will predominantly be concerned with supplying the 
needs associated with the vegetative portion of one’s soul).  Therefore, only a community can be 
self-sufficient as a whole, providing the resources necessary for flourishing: “τ δ αταρκες 
λέγοµεν οκ ατ µόν, τ ζντι βίον µονώτην, λλ κα γονεσι κα τέκνοις κα γυναικ 
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κα λως τος φίλοις κα πολίταις, πειδ φύσει πολιτικν  νθρωπος.”72  Additionally, for the 
individual to partake of the self-sufficiency of the city-state, he must participate in political activity 
that directs and guides the community.  Otherwise, the citizen is a dependent on the state, having no 
say in the course that the city-state, and thus his own life, will take.  Thus, the ideal ‘πόλις’ must 
allow for the participation of all its citizens, for political participation is necessary for the exercise of 
prudence and the achievement of self-sufficiency, both of which characterize human flourishing.  
 In developing an ideal theory of politics, MacIntyre relies on ethical concerns about creating 
and sustaining a community of independent practical reasoners.  As noted above, independent 
practical reasoning is a sine qua non for human flourishing as conceived in an Aristotelian sense.  
However, we do not emerge at birth fully armed with the completely developed faculty of practical 
reason: “We become independent practical reasoners through participation in a set of relationships 
to certain particular others who are able to give us what we need.”73  Even so, once we have attained 
a position from which we may utilize our practical reason independently, we “continue to the end of 
our lives to need others to sustain us in our practical reasoning.”74  We can see how MacIntyre’s 
arguments here are simply a rewording of Aristotle’s own positions on subjects such as the necessity 
of prudence for the exercise of virtue as well as the impossibility for human beings to detach 
themselves from society and still live a ‘εδαίµων’ life. Therefore, if independent practical reasoning 
(or prudence) is itself only possible under certain conditions, it is the purpose of politics to ensure 
that those conditions are present; for clearly “[a]n individualist and minimalist conception of the 
common good is then too weak to provide adequate justification for the kind of allegiance that a 
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political society must have from its members, if [that society] is to flourish.”75  If politics does not 
fulfill its ethical purpose in making flourishing possible for individual humans, MacIntyre finds that 
there is little reason to credit that politics’ claims to be legitimate and worthy of allegiance. 
 Both Aristotle and MacIntyre present conditions necessary for an ideal state; although 
MacIntyre does not directly elaborate on Aristotle’s presentation of the ideal (found in Books VII 
and VIII of the Politics), their two accounts of the ideal state share many resemblances by virtue of 
the fact that the two thinkers are more or less utilizing the same conception of human flourishing.  
Between Dependent Rational Animals and “Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good,” MacIntyre 
identifies six conditions which an ideal ‘politics’ must meet in order for it to be considered 
legitimate, the first being the existence of “institutionalized forms of deliberation to which all those 
members of the community who have proposals, objections and arguments to contribute have 
access.”76  If one is to exercise practical reason, there must needs be a forum in which one may 
exercise it among society, without which practical reason cannot be developed nor sustained.   
Secondly, regardless of which other virtues each communal tradition decides to value, every 
community must aim to inculcate the virtue of what MacIntyre vaguely calls ‘just generosity’ among 
its members.  Although believing himself to be in disagreement with Aristotle, MacIntyre actually 
agrees with the philosopher when he brings into question the idea that a man or woman might be 
able to become self-sufficient.  Aristotle’s reconfiguration of justice legitimated the role of the ‘πόλις’ 
as the seat of justice by deriving it from arguments about human flourishing.  If, as Aristotle 
believes, individual flourishing only takes place when the individual integrates himself into the self-
sufficient city-state, he must now exercise his virtue in a way which is directed toward the common 
good of the city-state (or at least in a way which is in harmony with the city-state).  Aristotelian 
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commentators have called the practice of virtue for the common good to be ‘general justice’ or what 
Aristotle identifies as the whole of virtue: “ατη µν ον  δικαιοσύνη ο µέρος ρετς λλ 
λη ρετή στιν, οδ  ναντία δικία µέρος κακίας λλ λη κακία.”77  By acknowledging 
the dependence of humans on the city-state, an individual’s own virtuous activity has become 
absorbed by the city-state.  Virtue no longer is merely for the sake of one’s own flourishing; it 
contributes to the well-being and flourishing of the self-sufficient organism that is the ‘πόλις’. 
Therefore, in MacIntyre’s own understanding and expansion of this principle, every human 
agent is to some extent dependent upon a system of giving and receiving which sustains human 
relationships for the reason that an individual will always be a part of some greater social entity.  The 
problem which faces MacIntyre is that no already existing virtue is particularly fitting for the 
practices of giving and receiving; “we will find that neither ‘generosity’ nor ‘justice’, as these have 
been commonly understood, will quite supply what is needed, since according to most 
understandings of the virtues one can be generous without being just and just without being 
generous, while the central virtue required to sustain this kind of receiving and giving has aspects 
both of generosity and justice.”78  In a somewhat eccentric digression, MacIntyre points to the 
Lakota concept of wancantognaka, described as a fusion of generosity and justice.  However, he 
returns to Aquinas who believed liberality to be a part of justice, thus preparing the way for the 
virtue of just generosity.   
This virtue is transferred to his third condition in that we must extend our practices of giving 
and receiving to the chronically ill, the handicapped, the unborn, and the elderly among other 
groups: “[T]he political structures must make it possible both for those capable of independent 
practical reason and for those whose exercise of reasoning is limited or nonexistent to have a voice 
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in communal deliberation about what these norms of justice require.”79  In this respect, he differs 
significantly from Aristotle, who recommended that deformed infants not be reared in his ideal 
‘πόλις’.80  MacIntyre’s justification for differing from Aristotle lies in the realization that we are all 
dependents in some respect and thus owe considerations of ‘just generosity’ to all those born within 
the state (not only those who have the physical capacity to flourish).  These measures direct human 
beings toward a basic consideration of the common good inasmuch as it aids the fostering of 
practical reason. 
MacIntyre’s first three requirements are for the most part embodied in the fourth, the 
necessity of natural law.  The oddity of this suggestion (as the three requirements explained above 
are not usually considered to be part of natural law) is rendered more comprehensible when one 
examines what exactly MacIntyre means by the ‘natural law.’  Unlike Aquinas or any other 
prominent modern interpreter of Thomist natural law theory, MacIntyre holds the natural law to be 
procedural precepts: “they are justified as those precepts that all agents must observe in order to 
engage in common enterprises, which are, we should keep in mind, always at least in part enterprises 
of common inquiry.”81  Natural law precepts are to be regarded as absolutes despite the fact that it is 
conceivable that in certain situations procedure might demand otherwise.  They also may not only 
command of us certain actions but also demand that we possess certain virtues (such as just 
generosity described above).  With this in mind, it is far easier to understand the all-encompassing 
role which natural law plays in MacIntyre’s political philosophy.   
 MacIntyre’s fifth principle, which requires small political communities, is intertwined with 
those which have been previously discussed, for if one is participate in practical deliberation within a 
political setting, that setting must be limited to a community.  Regarding Athens, historians have had 
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varying notions as to its population during its height under Pericles: “A.W. Gomme long ago 
calculated a citizen population of 43,000 … M.H. Hansen has more recently suggested … a citizen 
population as high as 60,000.”82  However, the large majority of ‘πόλεις’ did not approach such a 
number, traditionally being composed of approximately 1,000 citizens.  The size of the ‘πόλις’ was 
apparently a determining factor as Aristotle himself says that any population which exceeds 100,000 
does not qualify as a city-state.83  Although the Greeks were well aware of larger political units, such 
were not considered ‘πόλεις’ although in a few instances (namely, in drama and other forms of 
literature not intended as objective descriptions of politics) we find that the term is used for the 
Persian Empire.84  
The populations of modern states far exceed the figures above and are simply too large for 
the interaction and institutions necessary for genuine practical deliberation to take place: “[Political 
societies] need to be small-scale so that, whenever necessary, those who hold political office can be 
put to the question by the citizens and the citizens put to the question by those who hold political 
office in the course of extended deliberative debate in which there is widespread participation and 
from which no one from whom something might be learned is excluded.”85  This echoes Aristotle’s 
recommendation that there be “ τς περβολς ρος, κ τν ργων δεν διον.”86  Such 
‘facts’ include the need for rulers to know the ruled and for the citizens to be acquainted with the 
characters of their fellow-citizens so that they might more effectively choose virtuous officials.  
Therefore, the state must be large enough to be self-sufficient, but small enough so that there is a 
certain degree of familiarity and opportunity of participation among the citizens. 
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There, however, is an additional reason for which MacIntyre proposes that politics might be 
best realized in small communities.  Such communities, in order to avoid the rampant pluralism of 
modern society, must to a certain extent be founded on a common culture and understanding of 
goods.  MacIntyre does not, therefore, understand himself as believing in community for 
community’s sake as he characterizes the tradition of neo-Tocquevillian pluralists or communitarians 
who still incorporate too much of the liberal tradition into their theories: “I see no value in 
community as such - many types of community are nastily oppressive - and the values of 
community, as understood by the American spokespersons of contemporary communitarianism, 
such as Amitai Etzioni, are compatible with and supportive of the values of liberalism that I 
reject.”87  MacIntyre here contrasts his own belief about the necessity of community (as the social 
arrangement where prudence and virtue might best be exercised) with other communitarians 
(Etzioni, the founding father of communitarianism, is named here) who view community more or 
less as a psychological need which has been neglected by, but is not incompatible with, modern 
liberalism.  MacIntyre ends with his stipulation that the politics of ‘acknowledged dependence’ can 
exist only where genuine free markets also can be found (rather than what commonly pass as ‘free 
markets’): “Genuinely free markets are always local and small-scale markets in whose exchanges 
producers can choose to participate or not.  And societies with genuinely free markets will be 
societies of small producers … in which no one is denied the possibility of the kind of productive 
work without which they cannot take their place in those relationships through which the common 
good is realized.”88   
What I have taken to be MacIntyre’s six requirements for a legitimate ‘politics’ (participatory 
institutions, just generosity, representation for dependents, natural law, a small population, and 
small-scale free markets) are clearly interrelated, as noted in the discussion of natural law.  From 
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what has been shown, it is clear that they arise from a concern about how best a political society 
might be organized around the goal of achieving human flourishing for its citizens.  Yet, although 
MacIntyre might present a unified (one would not err to call it Utopian as MacIntyre himself 
admits89) political theory, it leaves much to be desired in its recommendations for how one proceeds 
in the current world order.  Can the deliberation within the local community appropriately be called 
‘politics,’ especially if the state still exists above various communities?  Before these questions can be 
answered, we must first identify what is the main reason behind MacIntyre’s own rejection of the 
modern state as a legitimate example of the ‘politics.’ 
 The exercise of prudence which MacIntyre (and Aristotle) find to be necessary in the ideal 
political community is noticeably lacking in the modern liberal state.90  Any state which to some 
degree displays the corrosive effects of modernity (which includes, according to MacIntyre, lack of 
moral and philosophical coherency) in its governing institutions comes under condemnation; this of 
course does not make the inverse (‘pre-modern states are never condemned’) true.  MacIntyre is not 
proposing that Afghanistan under the Taliban was a legitimate state because it was relatively 
untouched by the modern world.  Yet the modern nation-state is in a particularly bad position 
because it does not even possess the resources to reform itself; since the liberal state (because of 
adopting a position of neutrality in situations where there is a dispute between rival moral views) 
cannot conduct its policy according to a single moral and philosophical framework, its government 
is characterized by endless infighting amongst different groups between which it pretends to 
moderate from an objective position.  Thus, since it cannot justify its existence through its 
dedication to human flourishing (i.e. in an Aristotelian sense), the government of the state justifies 
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its existence through the provision of certain services to its citizens.  In one of his better known 
passages, MacIntyre characterizes the modern state as follows: 
The modern nation-state, in whatever guise, is a dangerous and unmanageable institution, 
presenting itself on the one hand as a bureaucratic supplier of goods and services, which is always 
about to, but never actually does, give its clients value for money, and on the other as a 
repository of sacred values, which from time to time invites one to lay down one’s life on its 
behalf.  As I have remarked elsewhere … it is like being asked to die for the telephone 
company.91 
MacIntyre elsewhere describes modern states as “large, complex and often ramshackle [sets] of 
interlocking institutions, combining none too coherently the ethos of a public utility company with 
inflated claims to embody ideals of liberty and justice”92 and furthermore as “oligarchies disguised as 
liberal democracies.”93  As his exposition continues, it is clear that MacIntyre subscribes to a theory 
of the modern state akin to Weberian thought (holding that the state is defined by its use of force).  
Rather than being the political forum in which prudence might be exercised by all citizens, the 
modern state is rule by the few through force. 
 Similarly, since prudence governs the collective pursuit of virtue or of various goods for the 
soul, the modern state’s emphasis on individual freedom and value-neutrality makes it a particularly 
bad political arrangement, for it has little interest in virtues and values.  The liberal state cannot 
legitimately espouse certain values for all those under its authority; it must be value-neutral and 
adopt a cold scientific outlook in assessing policy.  This is because the liberal state is based upon the 
belief that the discovery of universal values is impossible; therefore, the state should refrain from 
imposing arbitrarily chosen values upon its citizens as much as possible.  Behind the façade of the 
rhetoric of freedom and pluralism there lies the reality of a bureaucratized Weberian state, isolated 
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against its citizens and any coherent articulation of values.  Zweckrationalität (rationality directed 
toward identifying profitable courses of action) has seemingly dispensed with Wertrationalität 
(rationality concerned with value-judgments).  However, although MacIntyre would think it 
philosophically unjustifiable, the liberal state often does adopt certain moral positions (such as 
valuing freedom and equality), and those who espouse them might be sincere.  Yet there is no 
philosophical justification for doing so; therefore, it makes appeals to values such as freedom and 
equality no more rationally justifiable than appeals to the Bible for political values.  Even the 
German Rechtstaat (a state supposedly guided by law and justice) was revealed by Weber to be a 
smoke-screen, obscuring the fact that “the legally prescribed purposes of bureaucratic regulation are 
false purposes, which entrap human beings within false orientations and alienate them from the 
conditions of their freedom.”94   
 The idea of the modern liberal state therefore ends in a paradox: it forces unjustified values 
(however pleasant they may sound to us) upon its citizens, thus threatening to undercut even the 
freedom the modern state was intended to guarantee: “The consequence of Weber’s [relativism] is 
that in his thought the contrast between power and authority, although paid lip-service to, is 
effectively obliterated as a special instance of the disappearance of the contrast between 
manipulative and non-manipulative social relations.”95  By this, MacIntyre means that without any 
values there is no reason to justify even the existence of the state apart from the use of blunt power.  
If one espouses a form of relativism like Weber’s, there is no reason to value freedom over slavery.  
Therefore, if the state claims to value freedom, it is doing so irrationally and thus forces that value 
upon its citizens.  Since one cannot prove through reason that freedom is a value that ought to be 
valued by all people, the state must attempt to manipulate its citizens into believing that freedom is 
of value, either through rhetorical or physical force.  Thus, as MacIntyre says, all relationships 
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between the state and its citizens become relationships of manipulation rather than ones based on 
rational justification.  The state, rather than being the guardian of the values of law and justice, is 
instead the guardian of only its own interests.  The value-deprived foundation upon which modern 
state theory is constructed cannot but collapse under the pressure of justifying state legitimacy and 
liberal values, bringing the superstructure with it down into the abyss of nihilism. 
 Therefore, the modern liberal state obviates the exercise of prudence in the public sphere 
because it does not even a philosophically coherent articulation of values; it hardly qualifies as 
MacIntyre’s (or Aristotle’s for that matter) ideal state.  Yet what if the state was not liberal?  What if 
it did indeed articulate a single moral position?  This is an alternative proposed by Thaddeus 
Kozinski.  Kozinski himself questions “why precisely is the nation-state incompatible with genuine 
political activity?  In certain places, MacIntyre explains it in terms of population, its great size 
precluding it from embodying a consensus on a particular tradition of rationality and conception of 
the good; but in other places, he speaks in qualitative terms, suggesting that it is the state’s complex, 
bureaucratic structure that prevents it from performing genuine political activity.  If size is not the 
essential problem then could the state embody genuine political activity in the event of a nation-wide 
consensus on a particular conception of the good?”96  However, Kozinski has neglected to recount 
or does not understand the reasoning behind MacIntyre’s demand for a small community, for 
MacIntyre justifies the limited size in quantitative terms.  If the state is too large, then it will lose the 
necessary connections between its citizens but also the size necessary for all citizens to participate in 
deliberating about what is best for the political community.  Therefore, insofar as many modern states 
(especially in the West) can be considered ‘liberal,’ they fail to have the resources necessary to qualify 
as ideal states.  Yet even those that are not liberal may not qualify as ideal states because of their 
large size.   
                                                           
96 Thaddeus J. Kozinski, “Alasdair MacIntyre’s Political Liberalism” in The Political Science Reviewer XXXVI, (2007), 283.  
42 
 
 The modern reader of MacIntyre thus finds himself in a predicament: if one is convinced by 
MacIntyre’s argument about human flourishing and the ideal state, how does one go about attaining 
that ideal (since it is clearly not in existence among us)?  MacIntyre makes it very clear that the 
modern state and its politics must be rejected.  And yet, how is one expected to form (or at least 
strive for) ideal political communities without some cooperation from the modern state?  
Additionally, once these communities are formed, what is the relationship between the state and the 
community?  MacIntyre claims that the community will treat the state as “an ineliminable feature of 
the contemporary landscape” and subsequently “will not despise the resources that it affords.”97  
Such an explanation, though, is vague and still does not fully explain the desired end or the details of 
the relationship.  This failing in MacIntyre’s political theory would undoubtedly be what critic Keith 
Breen describes as a ‘Manichean’ division between state and community, that is, Manichean in the 
sense that it divides the world into an eternal battle between the evil state and the good community.  
The relationship between the two is not conducted under clear and determined guidelines but rather 
as “a battle of fire and ice.”98   
 The questions which arise from a consideration of the ideal MacIntyrean (and Aristotelian) 
state are ones that are not purely ethical.  We are not compelled to ask at what we ought to aim; that 
has already been made manifestly clear by MacIntyre’s discussion of ethics and virtue.  What we do 
need to ask is what we can do in our present circumstances to aim at the ideal state or, rather, which 
courses of action are within our power.   This is of course highly dependent upon the regime type 
under which one lives.  One must not lose sight of the fact that if the cultivation of the virtues can 
only be pursued in a certain political arrangement, politics is then to some extent prior to ethics and 
cannot simply be taken to be as the public embodiment of a moral code.  Politics is concerned with 
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bringing that ideal political arrangement into existence and must therefore occupy itself with 
questions of power. 
 MacIntyre’s own narrow interpretation of the essence of ‘politics’ as being an extension of 
ethics is easier to understand in light of his selective treatment of the Aristotelian corpus.  In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle repeatedly informs the reader that the study of the human good is a 
branch of the science of politics, for “χρωµένης δ ταύτης τας λοιπας πρακτικας τν 
πιστηµν, τι δ νοµοθετούσης τί δε πράττειν κα τίνων πέχεσθαι, τ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι 
ν τ τν λλων, στε τοτ ν εη τνθρώπινον γαθόν.”99  Political science itself is but a 
subcategory of prudence and concerns itself with public deliberation concerning various goods and 
ends.  However, in the Ethics, there is little discussion about how the actual structure of the ‘πόλις’ 
affects the citizens’ exercise of virtue and prudence; it is simply assumed that it does.  A more 
thorough account of this subject matter, questions regarding ‘τ πολιτικ’ (ta politika) or literally 
those-things-which-relate-to-the-city, can be found in Aristotle’s work The Politics.  MacIntyre 
himself favors the Nicomachean Ethics in his account of the Aristotelian tradition, neglecting much of 
the Politics where it does not agree with the positions outlined in his treatise of choice.  This might be 
justified by looking at Books VII and VIII of the Politics (his description of the ideal πόλις) where 
Aristotle repeatedly says in one form or another that “τν ατν βίον ναγκαον εναι τν 
ριστον κάστ τε τν νθρώπων κα κοιν τας πόλεσι κα τος νθρώποις.” 100   Thus, 
if one has established what is best for an individual human, political matters are subordinated to 
these ethical concerns in that the sole concern of politics is to engineer a political arrangement 
where flourishing is promoted.  Yet as I have previously indicated, if the good life is not only 
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promoted but only possible in the ideal state, it would seem as if politics is prior to ethics; one first 
needs the ideal state before the citizens can become virtuous men and women.  Therefore, the 
problematic features of MacIntyre’s theory might be lessened upon investigating what Aristotle had 
to say about the πόλις as an entity having an existence and significance independent of ethical 
concerns. 
 My approach, then, to a portion of the Aristotelian tradition not thoroughly considered by 
MacIntyre will notably differ in its goals from the one regarding the Ethics.  The foremost aim of the 
outline below will be to seek answers to the questions raised in the description of MacIntyre’s theory 
of the community.  As has been noted, MacIntyre has failed to provide a satisfactory account of the 
relationship between the community and the modern state in two main respects.  First, MacIntyre 
has failed to elaborate upon what the ideal relationship would be between the two institutions: 
although he admits that the community is dependent upon the state for security and resources, his 
account of how the community “will always also have to be wary and antagonistic in all its dealings 
with the politics of the state” dooms his ‘ideal’ political situation to be one of eternal conflict.101  Of 
course, MacIntyre’s actual ‘ideal’ might be a situation in which the state has completely disappeared, 
but then questions arise as to who provides the resources and, more importantly, security to the 
community once the state is gone.  Additionally, even if one were to admit that the disappearance of 
the state would be the most desirable outcome, it seems that in our present situation there is no sign 
that the modern state is about to wither away.  As the state is an ‘ineliminable’ feature of the political 
landscape and members of the community therefore are compelled to conduct business with it, not 
only to secure resources, but also to obtain recognition for themselves as forming a legitimate 
political unit, MacIntyre needs to provide a satisfactory explanation about how that interaction fits 
into his larger state theory, that is, beyond describing it as being necessarily ‘antagonistic.’  Although 
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the modern liberal state differs tremendously from various ancient political institutions, I believe 
that authors within the Aristotelian tradition, most importantly Aristotle himself, address some of 
these concerns and can assist MacIntyre in formulating answers to these pressing issues.  
 Aristotle explicitly articulates his belief of the relationship between individual and city-state 
in the first book of the Politics where he writes “κα πρότερον δ τ φύσει πόλις  οκία κα 
καστος µν στιν.”102  This statement effectively flips MacIntyre’s own beliefs about the priority 
of ethics to politics upside-down, for the good of the city-state is understood to be greater than that 
of the individual: 
[I]t would be absurd to assign the good of a part more importance than the good of the whole, 
because no part can fare well in isolation from the whole to which it belongs.  A hand separated 
from the body cannot flourish as a hand because it no longer is one.  Similarly an isolated human 
being cannot fare well because he can no longer exercise the capacity without which he would 
not be classified as human.  Or, if he can carry on just as well, despite his isolation, then he is not 
a human being after all.103 
Therefore, because a human being is incapable of flourishing outside of a city-state, the individual 
has a vested interest in seeing the πόλις survive.  Certainly, the individual also wishes that his or her 
city-state might approximate the conditions for the ideal πόλις, but for that to happen, the city-state 
must first exist.  One might even be required to utilize less than virtuous means in ensuring that 
one’s city-state survive.   
 Aristotle develops this thought further in Book III with what Hibbs has called the 
distinction between the good man and the good citizen: “In his reaction against the modern 
separation of ethics from politics, MacIntyre seems at times to go to the other extreme, to fuse his 
politics to an ethical conception of the good life.  How Aristotelian is such a fusion?  While closely 
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related, politics for Aristotle is not simply an elaboration or expansion of ethics.  The Ethics depicts 
the model of the good man, whereas the Politics operates with the distinction between the good man 
and the good citizen.  No such distinction seems to be operative in MacIntyre’s political thought.”104  
In the ideal regime, the good man and the good citizen are identical as the whole state has been 
designed for that end.  However, in imperfect political arrangements, such is clearly not the case.  If 
the good citizen is concerned with the city-state and the good man is concerned with his own 
flourishing, they will conflict when the city-state does not take for its goal the promotion of human 
flourishing.  Additionally, the citizen’s concern with the city-state is not an impulse to improve his 
own state’s constitution by swiftly forcing it to become the ideal state.  On the contrary, the good 
citizen is concerned most of all to preserve the city-state and ensure its security: “µοίως τοίνυν κα 
τν πολιτν, καίπερ νοµοίων ντων,  σωτηρία τς κοινωνίας ργον στί, κοινωνία δ στν 
 πολιτεία: δι τν ρετν ναγκαον εναι το πολίτου πρς τν πολιτείαν.”105  Improvement 
of the constitution is only legitimate when overseen by a prudent ruler who believes it will ensure 
greater stability and security; for example, “a citizen who helps transform a moderate oligarchy or a 
moderate democracy into a polity is doing exactly what needs to be done in order to preserve his 
constitution.  He is making his mixed constitution a better mixture, because the better the balance 
between rich and poor, the stronger and more stable the city.”106  However, such reform is bound to 
be gradual and proceed incrementally rather than at once (as that would be destabilizing). 
 The utopianism of MacIntyre’s own political teachings is quite surprising in light of this 
description of Aristotle’s realism.  However, one might object that Aristotle’s focus on the πόλις is 
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itself ‘utopian,’ “given that his own political status was that of subject to the Macedonian kings.”107  
And Aristotle is sometimes spoken of as nostalgic for the days in which the Greek city-states were 
independent rather than dominated by the Macedonian empire.  However, one must ask whether or 
not this agrees with what we know of Aristotle and Greek history.  For contrary to what apparently 
is the common opinion, Philip of Macedon did not destroy the democratic apparatus of every Greek 
city-state in the period after the Battle of Khaironeia.  Instead, Philip’s main action post-Khaironeia 
was to organize the Greeks under the League of Corinth, the purpose of which was “to maintain a 
common peace in Greece and to retaliate against the Persians for the invasion of 480 BC and other 
acts of aggression against Greeks.”108  Although the Greek city-states lost much of their autonomy 
with regard to foreign policy, some city-states such as Athens retained most of their democratic 
features, “in particular the sovereignty of the Demos and the equal right of all citizens to participate 
in the assembly and the law-courts … until the imposition of an oligarchic constitution, in particular 
a property qualification for citizenship, by the Makedonian Antipater in 322.”109  Aristotle himself 
might have strongly approved of the League, not only by virtue of being closely connected with the 
Macedonian royal family but also because his ideal state ought to be more concerned with internal 
affairs rather than external ones.110 
 A further reason why Aristotle would have approved of the League nor been alarmed that it 
signaled the end of the πόλις is that it was structured in a way similar to many federal states in the 
northern half of Greece.  Indeed, Aristotle himself was a member of such a federal state(his native 
city of Stageira was a member of the Chalcidice federation).  A federal state, τ κοινν (literally, 
‘that which is common’) was characterized generally by a division of labor in which “foreign affairs 
and diplomacy belonged primarily to the federal government” and local government controlled local 
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affairs.111  Additionally, we have a curious comment made by Aristotle concerning the Greek city-
states in his discussion of the ideal state which reads: “διόπερ λεύθερόν τε διατελε κα βέλτιστα 
πολιτευόµενον κα δυνάµενον ρχειν πάντων, µις τυγχάνον πολιτείας.”112  It is very possible that 
Aristotle is here referring to the League of Corinth and its effectiveness in uniting the Greeks against 
the Persian Empire under the Macedonian hegemon.  However, even if Aristotle does not mean to 
refer specifically to the League of Corinth, he is clearly well-disposed toward some kind of political 
unification among the Greek city-states.  Unlike MacIntyre, Aristotle can allow for larger political 
units than the πόλις; although the πόλις must remain to fufill certain functions, it can be easily 
incorporated into larger political arrangements with which it is not constantly at odds. 
 The significance of the above for MacIntyre cannot be overstated.  The Aristotle of the 
Politics is able to add a new dimension to the discussion of the state which to some extent legitimates 
interaction with the modern state in order to pursue the security and stability of one’s community.  
MacIntyre’s revolutionary brand of Aristotelianism does not agree well with the gradual, reformist 
mentality which we find in the Politics; Aristotle is much more willing for his rulers to head unjust 
regimes and acknowledge them as good citizens for their preservation of such regimes.  In this way, 
Aristotle provides the reader with justification for seeking political ends through the avenues offered 
by the modern state.  Additionally, Aristotle’s theory is itself compatible with an integration into 
some kind of federal system.  MacIntyre’s emphasis on the community as the sole political unit of any 
worth possibly blinds him to the willingness of the Greeks generally and Aristotle in particular to 
acknowledge the functional utility of federal states for ensuring the security of ‘πόλεις’. 
CONCLUDING  THOUGHTS  
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In conducting the above examination, I have tried to meet MacIntyre on his own terms by 
outlining how his method of doing philosophical historiography is bound up with his moral theory.  
I did not attempt to suggest certain modern theories which might best assist MacIntyre in solving 
the incoherencies and problems within his state theory.  Rather, I returned to the Aristotelian 
tradition to find perfectly valid answers which MacIntyre has ignored, answers about citizenship, the 
imperfect state, and the nature of politics.  For example, MacIntyre has suggested that modern states 
are nothing other than “oligarchies disguised as liberal democracies”113; he thus recommends that 
members of a community reject the politics of the modern liberal state.  However, is such a 
recommendation Aristotelian?  I think that it has been shown that although Aristotle did not 
abandon his ethical ideal as the ultimate end toward which one should aim, he realized that a good 
citizen must seek the preservation of the state rather than its overthrow.  Thus, pending the 
emergence of communities which qualify as ideal political communities, citizens of modern states 
may contribute to the life of that state in which they live and possibly direct it toward the ideal state, 
if that can be accomplished without destabilization.   
Additionally, Aristotle’s theory is not inherently antagonistic to a federal system of 
government in which the city-states retain many of their privileges while ceding their foreign policy 
to the federation.  It seems that in an ideal world where political communities require resources 
from a larger political organization, yet seek to maintain a certain amount of independence in their 
pursuit of the good life, the federal state proves fitting.  Of course, these suggestions provide at best 
a structural skeleton, the substance of which will vary according to the political situation.  Yet that is 
exactly what Aristotle realized in his Politics; by refusing to focus exclusively on the ideal state, 
Aristotle demonstrates that political science, in studying the nature of power across a wide range of 
government types, can offer guidelines of how to act in oligarchy (in contrast to a democracy and vice 
                                                           
113 MacIntyre, “Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good,” 237. 
50 
 
versa).  Of course, the systems of government of the modern world differ tremendously from the 
ancient world.  Therefore, rather than rejecting the modern state as utterly corrupt and then ignoring 
it, he or she who wishes to aim for the ideal community must make a study of the modern state and 
its politics.  To do so is not to reject any ethical ideal; on the contrary, it is to accept that in aiming at 
an ethical ideal of human flourishing, every human must learn to balance their obligations as a good 
man and as a good citizen. 
In summation, I find Alasdair MacIntyre to be a man obsessed with the πόλις, for it is only 
in the πόλις that man achieves flourishing as a practitioner of virtuous activities and deliberator 
about the common good.  Certainly, there is much to be admired in MacIntyre’s description of the 
ideal community, and I believe there is nothing in what he has written to prevent that political 
institution from being the primary one in a theory of the state.  However, if MacIntyre is 
endeavoring to propose a realistic program for the return to a community-centered life, he will need 
to go beyond the πόλις and accept the legitimacy of other political institutions.  In so doing, he will 
not betray his own Aristotelian premises; rather, I feel he will be more faithful to a view of 
Aristotelianism more comprehensive than his narrow reading of the Nicomachean Ethics.  As we have 
seen, by turning to Aristotle’s Politics and others in the tradition, MacIntyre can draw on a wide array 
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